Initial Vexta Core v0.1.0 release

src/consensus/merkle.cpp

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2009-2020 The Bitcoin Core developers
+// Copyright (c) 2014-2020 The DigiByte Core developers
+// Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
+// file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
+
+#include <consensus/merkle.h>
+#include <hash.h>
+
+/*     WARNING! If you're reading this because you're learning about crypto
+       and/or designing a new system that will use merkle trees, keep in mind
+       that the following merkle tree algorithm has a serious flaw related to
+       duplicate txids, resulting in a vulnerability (CVE-2012-2459).
+
+       The reason is that if the number of hashes in the list at a given level
+       is odd, the last one is duplicated before computing the next level (which
+       is unusual in Merkle trees). This results in certain sequences of
+       transactions leading to the same merkle root. For example, these two
+       trees:
+
+                    A               A
+                  /  \            /   \
+                B     C         B       C
+               / \    |        / \     / \
+              D   E   F       D   E   F   F
+             / \ / \ / \     / \ / \ / \ / \
+             1 2 3 4 5 6     1 2 3 4 5 6 5 6
+
+       for transaction lists [1,2,3,4,5,6] and [1,2,3,4,5,6,5,6] (where 5 and
+       6 are repeated) result in the same root hash A (because the hash of both
+       of (F) and (F,F) is C).
+
+       The vulnerability results from being able to send a block with such a
+       transaction list, with the same merkle root, and the same block hash as
+       the original without duplication, resulting in failed validation. If the
+       receiving node proceeds to mark that block as permanently invalid
+       however, it will fail to accept further unmodified (and thus potentially
+       valid) versions of the same block. We defend against this by detecting
+       the case where we would hash two identical hashes at the end of the list
+       together, and treating that identically to the block having an invalid
+       merkle root. Assuming no double-SHA256 collisions, this will detect all
+       known ways of changing the transactions without affecting the merkle
+       root.
+*/
+
+
+uint256 ComputeMerkleRoot(std::vector<uint256> hashes, bool* mutated) {
+    bool mutation = false;
+    while (hashes.size() > 1) {
+        if (mutated) {
+            for (size_t pos = 0; pos + 1 < hashes.size(); pos += 2) {
+                if (hashes[pos] == hashes[pos + 1]) mutation = true;
+            }
+        }
+        if (hashes.size() & 1) {
+            hashes.push_back(hashes.back());
+        }
+        SHA256D64(hashes[0].begin(), hashes[0].begin(), hashes.size() / 2);
+        hashes.resize(hashes.size() / 2);
+    }
+    if (mutated) *mutated = mutation;
+    if (hashes.size() == 0) return uint256();
+    return hashes[0];
+}
+
+
+uint256 BlockMerkleRoot(const CBlock& block, bool* mutated)
+{
+    std::vector<uint256> leaves;
+    leaves.resize(block.vtx.size());
+    for (size_t s = 0; s < block.vtx.size(); s++) {
+        leaves[s] = block.vtx[s]->GetHash();
+    }
+    return ComputeMerkleRoot(std::move(leaves), mutated);
+}
+
+uint256 BlockWitnessMerkleRoot(const CBlock& block, bool* mutated)
+{
+    std::vector<uint256> leaves;
+    leaves.resize(block.vtx.size());
+    leaves[0].SetNull(); // The witness hash of the coinbase is 0.
+    for (size_t s = 1; s < block.vtx.size(); s++) {
+        leaves[s] = block.vtx[s]->GetWitnessHash();
+    }
+    return ComputeMerkleRoot(std::move(leaves), mutated);
+}
+